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"It's estimated that 'cyberslacking' is responsible for up to a
40% loss in employee productivity and can waste up to 60%
of a company's bandwidth!"'
"Secret monitoring is the merciless electronic whip that drives
the fast pace of today's workplace.... In essence, concealed
surveillance combines the worst features of 19th century
factory labor relations with 20th century technology, creating
an electronic sweatshop."2
I. INTRODUCTION

The modem workplace is saturated with the electronic tools of e-mail
and the Internet. In 2000, forty million American employees sent sixty
billion e-mails.' At the same time, almost 250 million people worldwide
used the Internet.4 Companies have learned that the use of these tools in
commerce can have a positive effect on the bottom line.5 Yet, unrestricted
use and abuse of these same tools by employees may financially harm the
company's operations and may subject the company to civil and criminal
liability.6 Nevertheless, these tools cannot be altogether removed from the

1. 8e6 Technologies Advertisement, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2001, at A6.
2. Robert G. BoehmerArtificialMonitoringandSurveillanceofEmployees: The FineLine
Dividingthe PrudentlyManagedEnterprisefrom the Modern Sweatshop,41 DEPAuL L. REv. 739,
808 (1992) (quoting COMM. WORKERS OF AM. LEIS. FACT SHEET No. 101-2-2, SECRET
MONITORING 1-2 (1990)).
3. Paul E. Hash & Christina M. Ibrahim, E-mail, Electronic Monitoring, and Employee
Privacy, 37 S. TEX. L. REv. 893, 894 (1996).
4. Mark Ishman, Comment, Computer Crimes and the Respondeat Superior Doctrine:
Employers Beware, 6 B.U. J. SCL. & TECH. L. 6 (2000).
5. See, e.g., Amy Rogers, You Got Mail But Your Employer Does Too: Electronic
CommunicationandPrivacyin the 21st Century Workplace, 5 J. TECH. L. &POL'Y 1, 1-3 (Spring
2000) (listing the elimination of travel and reduced time and cost of communications as two major
benefits).
6. See id. at 4.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol54/iss2/3

2

Kesan: Cyber-Working or Cyber-Shirking?: A First Principles Examination
FIRSTPRINCIPLES EXAMINATION OF ELECTRONIC PRIVACYIN THE WORKPLACE

workplace without losing the competitive benefits of electronic
communication in their respective businesses and without adversely
affecting employee morale.' Many businesses have chosen policies of
restricting the use of e-mail and the Internet as a middle ground, and most
perform electronic monitoring of some form.' The 2001 American
Management Association (AMA) survey reports the following:
More than three-quarters of major U.S. firms (77.7%)
record and review employee communications and activities
on the job, including their phone calls, e-mail, Internet
connections, and computer files. The figure has doubled since
1997....
Additional forms of monitoring and surveillance, such as
reviewing phone logs or videotaping for security purposes,
bring the overall figure on electronic oversight to 82%, up
from 67% just two years ago. On average, 88% of companies
engaged in any such practices inform their employees of their
polices.
In efforts to control employee misuse or personal use of
telecommunications equipment ... 40% [of firms] block
Internet connections to unauthorized or inappropriate websites
(up from 29% [in 2000]).'
Furthermore, a comparison of the 2001 AMA survey with the 2000 survey
shows the following with regard to a major use of employer
monitoring-disciplining employees:
Misuse or personal use of:
% Reporting Discipline
Any
Dismissal
Formal Reprimand or
Warning
Informal Reprimand or
Warning

E-Mail

Internet

2000 2001

2000 2001

44.8 54.5
16.0 18.6

41.9 51.0
17.4 20.3

29.6

26.1

38.7

22.3 24.8

33.6

19.7 23.010

7. See id. at 2.
8. Dan McIntosh, Comment, E-monitoring@workplace.com:The FutureofCommunication
Privacy in the Minnesota Private-SectorWorkplace, 23 HAMLn L. REV. 539, 541 (2000).
9. 2001 AMA Survey: Workplace Monitoring & Surveillance, Summary of Key Findings,
at http://www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/emsshort200l.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2002).
10. Id.; 2000 AMA Survey: Workplace Monitoring & Surveillance, available at
http://www.amanet.org/research/archives.htm.
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The Workplace Surveillance Project reports the following: out of a total
workforce of 140 million, 40 million of whom are online, 14 million U.S.
employees (10%) are under "continuous" online surveillance." The 14
million estimate is composed of 6.25 million (about 4.5%) and 7.75
million (about 5.5%) employees subject to continuous e-mail and Internet
monitoring respectively. 2 Additionally, the 2000 AMA survey reports that
4.6% and 9.2% of employers conduct continuous e-mail monitoring and
Internet connection monitoring respectively. 3
Monitoring electronic communications raises the issue of an
employee's right to privacy in personal dealings at work and creates new
uncertainties about whether such a right exists and the contours of that
right. Employee privacy has been called "the sleeping giant of the '90s,"' 4
and electronic monitoring provokes concerns similar to those raised by the
monitoring of telephones, regular mail, personal conversations,, and an
employee's physical location within the workplace, all of which are areas
where the law is more or less restrictive of employer action. 5 With respect
to electronic, non-telephonic communication, the law in the United States
tends to favor the interests ofthe employer. Thus, some form of monitoring

11. Andrew Schulman, The Extent ofSystematicMonitoringofEmployee E-mail andinternet
Use, Privacy Foundation: Workplace Surveillance Project (citing source of research asNielsen/Net
Ratings, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and Int'l Labour Org.), at http://www.privacyfoundation.
org/workplace/technology/extent.asp (last visited Jan. 21, 2002).
12. Id.The Workplace Surveillance Project does not account for employees who are subject
to both kinds of monitoring. Id.
13. 2000 AMA Survey: Workplace Monitoring & Surveillance, supra note 10.
14. David Neil King, Note, Privacylssues in the Private-SectorWorkplace: Protectionfrom
ElectronicSurveillanceand the Emerging "PrivacyGap," 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 441,441 (1994).
15. See MATrHEW W. FINKIN, PRIVACY INEhLOYMENTLAW 113-24 (BNA 1995 & Cumm.
Supp. 2000) (providing a good discussion of monitoring at the workplace); see also Laurie Thomas
Lee, Watch Your E-mail!: Employee E-mail Monitoring and Privacy Law in the Age of the
"Electronic Sweatshop," 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 139, 139 (1994) ("Employee privacy is
considered to be the most significant workplace issue facing companies today."); Lawrence E.
Rothstein, Privacy or Dignity?: Electronic Monitoringin the Workplace, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J.INT'L
& CoMP. L. 379, 379 (2000) ("The growth of electronic surveillance in the workplace has been
phenomenal and has created aglobal problem."); Jarrod J. White, Commentary, E-mail@workcom:
Employer Monitoring of Employee E-mail, 48 ALA. L. REV. 1079, 1079 (1997) ("[E]merging
technology at the sunset of the twentieth century, particularly the pervasive use of electronic mail
(E-mail) by private sector companies, has unleashed new uncertainty concerning privacy rights in
the workplace."); Note, Addressing the New Hazards of the High Technology Workplace, 104
HARV. L. REV. 1898, 1910 (1991) (hereinafterNew Hazards)("Use of electronic mail has lent new
shape to two age-old workplace conflicts: how much access employers should have to their
employees' workspace, and how much freedom employees should have to use workplace resources
for their own purposes. The unique status of electronic mail as somewhere between traditional
business communications, such as memos, and traditional private communications, such as personal
letters and phone calls, creates a conflict that seriously threatens employee privacy interests.").
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has become the favored policy of many firms, but there may exist less
intrusive safeguards for employers, and the actual privacy afforded
employees may be determined by the details of "e-policies," which are
extensions of the corporate culture.
This Article begins by establishing the failure of statutory law or
common law in the United States to guarantee a right of electronic privacy
in the workplace. Unlike Europe, since we do not recognize a universal
right of privacy or human dignity, it is unlikely that we will see a legally
guaranteed zone ofprivacy in the American workplace. Proceeding on that
basis, I then ask how this issue can be addressed through a market-based,
contractarian framework and what principles should inform employeremployee e-policies that are typically being developed by U.S. firms. To
set the stage, in Part II, I explicate the underlying concerns of employers
and employees regarding access to e-mail and the Internet and electronic
privacy at the workplace. Relying on insights from microeconomic,
principal-agent theory, in Part III, I show that in the modem computerized
workplace, the difficulty in establishing supervision and control over the
agent's activities and the difficulty in controlling the flow of information
to and from the firm, together with the firm's need to employ the Internet
to capitalize on the enhanced efficiencies resulting from an online
presence, contribute to an overall loss in the principal's (i.e., the
employer's) power and lessens her ability to take effective, unilateral
action against the agent. As a result, it is possible to define an incentivecompatible, benefit-maximizing contract between employers and
employees based on the following principles: employee participation in
defining e-policies, full disclosure of all implementation schemes pursuant
to these e-policies, and employer monitoring to ensure compliance with
such e-policies. Such an incentive-compatible contract is superior to other
solutions based solely on self-interested behavior by either the principal or
the agent. Further, it is not only a lower cost result, but it also promotes
mutual trust and cultivates the development of fairness norms, thereby
increasing productivity and contributing to higher profits. Finally, I discuss
some specific implementation details ofe-policies designed along the lines
described above.
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II. THE CURRENT U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL LANDSCAPE

A. ConstitutionalLaw
Most public-sector employee workplace privacy claims rely upon
Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable search and seizure.'7
Private-sector employees are not similarly covered.'" Though not explicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution, a broad right to privacy has developed
based on implicit constitutional principles.' 9 Still, this right applies only to

instances of government intrusion and in circumstances in which the
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. In effect, there is no
federal constitutional guarantee of private employee privacy in the
workplace.2 ' Professor Laurence Tribe went as far as to propose a TwentySeventh Amendment to the Constitution to protect privacy rights from the
encroachment oftechnological advances, but "the state action requirement
would limit the practical effect ofthe amendment on private employers." 2
State constitutions provide little, if any, additional protection for the
employee. A number of state constitutions have an explicit guarantee of
privacy,23 but California is the only state granting constitutional privacy
rights to private sector workers. 4 In addition, though not tested in the
context of electronic monitoring, even California would likely support

16. This section is not an exhaustive survey of U.S. and international law regarding electronic

privacy in the workplace. Instead, the section is designed to highlight the failure of U.S. law to
provide for employee electronic privacy in the workplace. The applicable laws in select European
countries are briefly summarized to outline alternative legal approaches to the same issue.
17. See, e.g., Boehmer, supra note 2, at 773. The legal standard for protection is whether the
employee had a subjective and reasonable expectation of privacy. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
18. Kevin J. Conlon, Privacyin the Workplace, 72 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 285,285 (1996) ("The
[Supreme] Court has been reluctant to find state action in the private sector ...."). But cf
Boehmer, supra note 2, at 768 (suggesting that present-day corporate America threatens privacy
more than government).
19. See, e.g., King, supra note 14, at 442.
20. Kevin J. Baum, Comment, E-mail in the Workplace and the Right of Privacy, 42 VILL.

L. REv. 1011, 1018 (1997); cf generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21. See, e.g., Jonathan J.Green, Note, ElectronicMonitoring in the Workplace: The Need
for Standards,52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 438, 441 (1984) ("Although protection under the first and

fourth amendments is available to governmental employees, courts have been reluctant to find the
requisite 'state action' in the private sector, where the vast majority of workers are employed.").
22. S.Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the Public/PrivateDistinction: Employee Monitoring

in the Workplace, 32 GA. L. REv. 825, 862-63 (1998).
23. See, e.g., Larry 0. Natt Gantt, II, An Affront to Human Dignity: Electronic Mail
Monitoringin the Private Sector Workplace, 8 HARV. J.L. &TECH. 345, 389 (1995).

24. Lee, supra note 15, at 150. California requires an employer to demonstrate a compelling
interest in invading an employee's privacy. Id.; Conlon, supra note 18, at 286.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol54/iss2/3

6

Kesan: Cyber-Working or Cyber-Shirking?: A First Principles Examination
FIRST PRINCIPLESEXAMINAION OFELECTRONIC PRIVACYIN THE WORKPLACE

employer surveillance.25 An employee is left then with statutory, common,
or contract law for protection against unwanted invasion of privacy at the
hands of the employer.26 Though not directly applicable, the Fourth
Amendment provides courts a useful framework for analyzing privatesector workplace privacy disputes, whether founded in statutes or in
common law." The overarching issue again is whether the employee has
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances.28
B. FederalLaw
"The only federal law currently applicable to the issue of workplace email monitoring is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
[(ECPA)]. 29 "ECPA is an amendment to Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 196830 [(Title III)], also known as the
Federal Wiretap Law."31 The ECPA has two important branches: the Title
132 prohibition against the interception of wire, oral, and electronic
communications and the Title 133 prohibition against accessing stored
communications.34 Though the ECPA does not explicitly cover e-mail, the
addition of electronic communications wherever Title III covers for wire
and oral communications is normally interpreted to encompass e-mail.35
However, "whom" the ECPA protects "from whom" is less settled and
often debated.36

25. See Conlon, supra note 18, at 287.
26. Id. at 286.
27. See Boehmer, supra note 2, at 773-74. But see Steven B. Winters, Do Not Fold Spindle
or Mutilate:An Examinationof Workplace Privacy in ElectronicMail, 1 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
85,96-97 (1992) (accusing the Supreme Court of neglecting the goals of the judicial balancing test
with respect to privacy in the workplace through misinterpretation ofsociety's privacy values based
"on an outdated view of both the workplace and privacy generally").
28. Boehmer, supra note 2, at 774.
29. Peter Schnaitman, Buildinga Community Through Workplace E-mail: The New Privacy
Frontier,5 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 177, 184 (1998-99).
30. Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 801-804,82 Stat. 197,211-25 (1968) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1994) and 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1994)).
31. Schnaitman, supra note 29, at 184.
32. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (2000).
33. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2000).
34. Schnaitman, supra note 29, at 184-85.
35. See, e.g., Alexander I. Rodriguez, Comment, All Bark No Byte: Employee E-mail
PrivacyRights in the PrivateSector Workplace,47 EMORYL.J. 1439, 1449 (1998) (explaining that
judicial decisions have interpreted the zone created by the ECPA to include e-mail).
36. Compare Kevin P. Kopp, Comment ElectronicCommunications in the Workplace: Email Monitoringandthe Right ofPrivacy, 8 SETONHALL CONsT. L.J. 861,868 (1998) (discussing
how ECPA was enacted in "response to Congress' perception that abuses associated with new
technologies pose a substantial risk to civil liberties"), with Natt Gantt, supra note 23, at 352
("Congress was primarily concerned about protecting corporations against their competitors that
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"Although the ECPA would seem to protect workers from many types
of electronic monitoring, including [e]-mail interceptions, the law is not
clear with respect to the workplace, plus it contains some exceptions that
courts may determine exclude employee protection in certain respects." '
Title II contains "provider" and "user" exceptions (Title II exceptions)."
Likewise, three Title III exceptions are preserved by Title I:" 9 the "business
use" exception, 4° the "provider" exception, 4' and the "consent" exception
(Title III exceptions). 41 Since e-mail can only be truly intercepted at the
moment between which it is transmitted and received, most employers
monitor stored e-mail communications and the Title II exceptions control.43
Under this caveat, each Title's exception is discussed in turn.
The Title Il provider exception exempts the "provider" of a
communications service, 44 though it is unclear what a "provider" is. 45 A
broad interpretation of "provider" allows any private employer with a
computer or network that stores e-mail to access the same.46 Thus, Title II
may trump any privacy granted to employees for their transmitted e-mail
since the employer may simply make and access a backup copy. 47 Yet,
some commentators warn that a narrow interpretation may not cover
businesses that subscribe to a common carrier for e-mall. 48 Though not
tested in the context of e-mail, the Title II user exception may be viewed
as analogous to the Title III consent exception.49
An employee may release an employer from liability under Title III by
consenting to monitoring, "unless such communication is intercepted for
might desire to steal valuable electronic information.").
37. Hash & Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 898.
38. Baum, supranote 20, at 1023.
39. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (2000).
40. Id. The business use exception is also known as "business extension" or "ordinary course
of business" exception. See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 35, at 1450.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2000).
42. Id. § 2511 (2)(d); see also Jared D. Beeson, Cyberprivacyon the CorporateIntranet:Does
the Law Allow Private-SectorEmployers to Read Their Employee's E-mail?, 20 U. HAW. L. REV.
165, 172-207 (1998) (theorizing how the exceptions apply to e-mail in light of the policies
informing judicial interpretation); Kopp, supra note 36, at 868 (discussing the exceptions).
43. Schnaitman, supra note 29, at 187; see also White, supra note 15, at 1083.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (2000).
45. See, e.g., Baum, supra note 20, at 1024.
46. Id.; see also Beeson, supranote 42, at 188 (concluding, from Bohach v. City ofReno, 932
F. Supp. 1232 (D. Nev. 1996), that employers have broad powers to access e-mal stored on
systems which they provide); Hash & Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 906.
47. See Natt Gantt, supra note 23, at 359-60 ("This interpretation gives employers who
provide their company E-mail networks almost 'unfettered discretion' to read and disclose the
contents of even their employees' personal [e]-mail messages."). But see Beeson, supra note 42,
at 197-99 (questioning whether Congress intended this "bizarre result").
48. See Beeson, supra note 42, at 199-200; see also Baum, supra note 20, at 1024.
49. See Baum, supra note 20, at 1025 n.70.
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the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act."5 Though consent
may be found circumstantially, courts "have been reluctant to find such
'implied consent.'... The extent to which a court will imply consent was
explored in the seminal case of Watkins v. L.M Berry & Co.52 The court
reasoned that "knowledge of the capability of monitoring alone cannot be
considered implied consent."53 Employers should use Watkins and similar
holdings as reason enough to implement a policy regarding e-mail
monitoring because "[w]ritten policies may support implied consent to
monitoring, at least within the terms of the policy."54
Title III also contains a provider exception,55 which places limitations,
without analogy in the Title II exception, upon the purpose for which
communications may be intercepted.56 Directed toward protecting a service
provider's normal operations and property, this exception only exempts an
employer's interception "incident to the rendition of the company's
services or when the company reasonably believes that the monitoring is
' Thus, it is not difficult for an
necessary to protect its rights or property."57
employer to fall within the "normal course of employment" exception,
considering that it can meet these provisions by showing, for example, that
its interception was to protect property (e.g., improper uses or theft) or to
provide the service (e.g., quality checks). Though easy to establish
justification, one commentator states that courts are likely to allow
employer-providers to monitor, but only when employing the least
intrusive means possible."
Finally, Title III provides a business use exception.59 Specifically, the
ECPA exempts certain standard apparatus from its definition of
"electronic, mechanical, or other device."6 Courts have advanced two
distinct approaches to the business use exception.6 The first, termed the

50. 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(d) (2000). Title II also implicitly exempts consensual access to
stored communications by prohibiting only unauthorized access. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (a)(1) (2000).
51. Hash & Ibrahim, supranote 3, at 900. Consent will not be "cavalierly implied." Watkins
v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581 (11 th Cir. 1983).
52. 704 F.2d 577, 581-82 (11th Cir. 1983).
53. Id. at 581 (emphasis omitted).
54. Hash & Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 900.
55. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(a)(i) (2000). Note, however, that this section expands upon the
Title II definition of communications provider to include "an operator of a switchboard, or an
officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication service, whose
facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic communication." Id.
56. See id.
57. Beeson, supra note 42, at 189.
58. Id. at 192-94. For example, a company worried about e-mail security could employ a
"firewall" rather than monitor the content of e-mail messages. Id.

59. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (2000).
60. See Natt Gantt, supra note 23, at 365-66.
61. Beeson, supra note 42, at 176.
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content approach, emphasizes the nature of the communication.62
Considering phone communication, courts have established the rule that
an employer may monitor business-related calls, but may only monitor
personal calls to the extent necessary to determine their nature.63 Further,
the court in Epps v. St. Mary's Hospital, Inc.6 4 indicated that a
communication may be considered business-related if it concerns the
operation of the business or other matters in which an employer has a legal
interest.65 The second, termed the context approach, "focuses on whether
the employer has a legitimate business interest justifying the
interception."66 The latest context cases employ a two-pronged analysis:
whether the monitoring equipment was from the service provider or
connected to the line by the subscriber and whether the interception was
conducted in the ordinary course of business. 67 Applying the first prong to
e-mail, an employer's successful exemption may depend on whether it
qualifies as a system provider.68
There is a "balancing process implicit in both the content and context
approaches [which] parallels the balancing of interests and limitation of
scope present in both tort and Fourth Amendment privacy analysis."6 9
Under the content approach, courts "decide the legitimacy of the
employer's interest.., by analyzing the purposes behind the monitoring
and whether the content of the communication is reasonably related to the
proffered purposes."7 Under the context approach, courts "determine the
reasonableness of the employee's expectations . . . by analyzing the
employer's notification procedures."7'
Critics of the ECPA are legion. In one way or another, many critics cite
the failure of the ECPA to protect employees from employer monitoring.'
The types of protected communications are limited. ECPA storage
protection is limited, and employers may escape the ECPA under the Title
II provider exception.7 Also, neither the ECPA nor any other federal law
protects "transactional" information such as the sender, recipient, and
subject lines of e-mail.74 Once an employer meets an exception, the ECPA

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 176-77.
See Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581-83 (11th Cir. 1983).
802 F.2d 412 (11th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 416-17; see also Beeson, supra note 42, at 179.
Beeson, supranote 42, at 179-80.
Id. at 180.
White, supra note 15, at 1086-87.
Natt Gantt, supra note 23, at 372.
Id.
Id.
See Wilborn, supranote 22, at 851.
See Rothstein, supra note 15, at 403.
See Joel R. Reidenberg & Francoise Ganet-Pol, The FundamentalRole of Privacyand
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places no restrictions on the manner and extent of monitoring, nor does it
require that an employer notify employees of monitoring.75 In sum, the
ECPA is ineffective in regulating the employer/employee relationship.76
"As a general matter, most commentators agree that, in view of the breadth
of the exceptions and provided that companies adopt comprehensive email policies, it will be difficult for employees to obtain recourse against
' "Without a definitive answer at this
their employers under the ECPA."77
time as to the scope ofmonitoring allowed by the ECPA, the best approach
for an employer is to develop and publish a policy regarding e-mail
and get employee acknowledgment and consent to that
monitoring
78
policy.
Multiple bills appeared in Congress in the early 1990s to address the
perceived gaps in employee electronic privacy, but none was ever enacted
into law.79 The Privacy for Consumers and Workers .Act 80 (PCWA),
introduced by former Senator Paul Simon, is representative of the various
bills that were considered.8 It was intended to constrain the broad
exceptions granted to businesses by the ECPA.8" The single most important
element shared by the bills was an employer's responsibility to notify
employees of the details of its electronic monitoring programs.83
Businesses, especially small operations," were strongly opposed to the
notice requirement due to its cost and interference with their monitoring
duties. Other common elements were expanded definitions of "employer"
Confidence in the Network, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 105, 115 (1995).
75. Christopher S. Miller & Brian D. Poe, Employment Law Implicationsin the Controland
MonitoringofE-mail Systems, 6 U. MIAMI BUS. L.J. 95, 101 (1997).
76. See Susan Ellen Bindler, Note, Peek and Spy: A Proposalfor FederalRegulation of
Electronic Monitoringin the Work Place, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 853, 871-75 (1992).
77. Peter Brown, Policies for Corporate Internet and E-mail Use, in THIRD ANNUAL
INTERNETLAW INSTITUTE 648 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course,
Handbook Series No. GO-0015, 1999).
78. George B. Trubow, Constitution v. Cyberspace: Has the First Amendment Met Its
Match?, 5 BuS. L. TODAY 41, 41 (Mar./Apr. 1996); see also Beeson, supra note 42, at 207-09
(criticizing the ECPA and suggested legislative reform).
79. Donald R. McCartney, Comment, Electronic Surveillance and the Resulting Loss of
Privacyin the Workplace, 62 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REv. 859, 882 (1994).
80. S.984, 103d Cong. § 1 (1993).
81. Boehmer, supra note 2, at 807.
82. McCartney, supra note 79, at 886.
83. Id. at 883. Notice must be given to all parties to a communication (including third parties)
and applies both to the intent to monitor and to signaling when monitoring is occurring. Bindler,
supra note 76, at 867-68. An exception to the notice requirement was available to employers who
suspected an employee of engaging in an "unlawful activity, willful gross misconduct," or conduct
adversely affecting the business. Lee, supra note 15, at 168.
84. See Lee, supra note 15, at 169.
85. King, supra note 14, at 473; see also Julie A. Flanagan, Note, RestrictingElectronic
Monitoringin the PrivateWorkplace, 43 DuKEL.J. 1256, 1275 (1994) (ascribing to businesses the
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and "employee," periodic warning while monitoring, employee right to
access monitoring records, restrictions on monitoring to performancerelated information, and limitations on use and disclosure of personal
data.86 The largest benefit to workers who are surreptitiously monitored by
their bosses would have been the notice requirement.87 Another major
benefit was the near-universal ban on continuous monitoring. 8 But, the
PCWA had detractors, mainly from the business world. Businesses
objected to the proposed act's restrictions on their ability to assess
information from monitoring or to use that information to reward or punish
their employees.8 9 At the extreme, businesses also feared that they would
lose their best weapon against employee computer crime.9" Lamenting the
lack of recognition of a right to privacy, one commentator adds, "[t]he
biggest problem with the proposed Act is not the fact that it fails to
accomplish its purpose, but that it represents yet another Act that attempts
to deal with manifestations of the problem without confronting the
underlying cause of the problem[:]" the lack of an underlying, affirmative
employee right to privacy. 1
Academics, students, and practitioners have responded with numerous
legislative proposals to expand employee privacy rights. Some proposals
are broad, encompassing a number ofrecurring themes. One commentator,
mirroring the PCWA, outlines the elements which an ideal statute should
contain: monitoring is limited to the workplace and not permitted in private
areas, continuous and secret monitoring is prohibited, those monitored
should be given notice while monitoring is occurring and should be given
access to the resulting information, monitoring should be limited to
legitimate business purposes and to information relevant to the job, and
employers should be restricted as to their use of monitoring data. Other
commentators support a Fourth Amendment reasonableness framework
requiring a "legitimate business purpose," the "least intrusive means
possible," and notice from the employer.93 Finding its genesis in the

complaint that restrictions on monitoring would hurt productivity and competitiveness with other

nations).
86. Boebmer, supra note 2, at 808-11.
87. See McCartney, supra note 79, at 885-86.
88. See id. at 885.
89. See Bindler, supra note 76, at 879-80; see also McCartney, supra note 79, at 887.
90. See McCartney, supra note 79, at 887.
91. Id. at 890-91.
92. Conlon, supra note 18, at 295.
93. Lee, supra note 15, at 172; Wilborn, supranote 22, at 852-53; see also Boehmer, supra
note 2, at 813 (removing the requirement of business purpose/interest and leaving a solution
granting "due process in the private sector"); cf Natt Gantt, supra note 23, at 416-17 (instituting
a "compelling business interest" test, while retaining a traditional balancing test for "transactional
information"). But cf Marc Rotenberg, FairInformationPracticesand the ArchitectureofPrivacy
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bargaining freedom traditionally allotted to employment relationships,
another proposal is built around an affirmative, yet alienable, employee
right to privacy in the workplace.94 Thus, a presumption exists, subject to
rebuttal by evidence of a bargain or by a compelling business interest, that
the employee has not waived privacy rights.95

C. State Law96
"The ECPA permits states to enact their own laws governing privacy
as long as those laws are at least as protective of privacy as the ECPA.
Most states have adopted the language of the ECPA with only minor
modifications, but a few state privacy laws provide even greater
protection."" New York and Massachusetts have similar statutes that
generally prohibit employer eavesdropping and recording of spoken
employee conversations in the workplace,9" but a court, in Restuccia v.
Burk Technology, Inc.,99 held that the Massachusetts statute did not apply
to electronic communications." ° Connecticut law requires that employers
inform employees of the existence and types of electronic monitoring but
exempts monitoring common areas for security and when the employer has
reasonable grounds to believe that an employee is creating a hostile
environment or is violating the law or the employer's legal rights.'
Connecticut may please advocates of employee rights, but fashioning
accepted solutions at the state level is fundamentally unlikely."°2 Differing
across jurisdictions in their nature and enforcement, state laws lack the
uniformity of federal law. Additionally, state law is ill-suited for regulating
a technology which erases state and national borders." 3 Furthermore,
(What Larry Doesn't Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REv, 1, 24-25 (taking exception to Professor

Lawrence Lessig's removal, from the definition of "monitoring," of "the concern that technology
allows organizations to exercise control over the actions of individuals" and finding Lessig's
resulting solution, based on disclosure and minimal burden, to be lacking).
94. Rodriguez, supra note 35, at 1467-69.
95. Id. at 1468-69
96. See Rothstein, supra note 15, at 404-05 (providing a breakdown of the degree of
protections afforded from state to state).
97. Brown, supra note 77, at 651.
98. See id. at 651-52.
99. No. 95-2125, 1996 Mass. Super. LEXIS 367 (Mass. Super. Ct., Middlesex County, Aug.
12, 1996).
100. Id. at *4-6; Brown, supra note 77, at 637, 651-52.
101. Brown, supra note 77, at 652-53; see Hall Adams, III et al., E-mail Monitoring in the
Workplace: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 67 DEF. COUNs. J. 32, 41 (2000) (listing of state
statutes addressing the interception of electronic communications).
102. But see Steven Winters, The New PrivacyInterest:Electronic Mail in the Workplace, 8
HIGH TECH. L.J. 197,223 (1992) (predicting that California law in this area will be widely adopted).

103. See Rothstein, supra note 15, at 404-05 (hinting that a state cannot reach those who
intercept a communication outside of the state).
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legislation with regard to workplace privacy regulation sometimes faces
overwhelming resistance from corporate lobbyists. 4
D. Common Law
The historical legal enforcement of privacy rights is based on claims
sounding in tort. 5 "In fact, the privacy right outlined by Brandeis and
Warren in their famous 1890 law review article came to be known as the
'American Tort."" 0'6 As a general rule, tort cases turn on the employees'
expectation of privacy. 7 An employee wishing to sue an employer for
invasion of privacy in the workplace may turn to the tort theories of
intentional infliction of emotional distress and privacy torts. 0 8 It is highly
unlikely that an employer's monitoring of e-mail would be found to rise to
the level of "extreme and outrageous conduct" as required by most courts
for actionable intentional infliction of emotional distress.'0 9 This leaves
privacy torts.
Privacy torts comprise four separate causes of action: (1) intrusion into
seclusion; (2) public disclosure of private or embarrassing facts; (3) false
light; and (4) appropriation of another's identity."0 Intrusion claims are the
most applicable to e-mail in the workplace."' An intrusion into seclusion
claim has three prima facie elements: (1) an intrusion; (2) that is highly
offensive; and (3) the employee had a reasonable expectation ofprivacy." 2
"Courts generally consider electronic surveillance . . . an 'intrusion'
sufficient to establish the first element of a prima facie case."'' 3 The
second element, proving electronic monitoring to be highly offensive, is
difficult because it does not involve a physical invasion.' '4 Regardless, the
line between the second and third elements has blurred.' Therefore, the

104. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 15, at 160.
105. Rotenberg, supra note 93, at 26.
106. The European Union Data Directive and Privacy: Before the House Committee on
International Relations (May 7, 1998) (statement of Marc Rotenberg, Director, Electronic Privacy
Information Center and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center), available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/intl/rotenberg-eu-testimony-598.html (last visited on Nov. 13,2001).
107. See Adams et al., supra note 101, at 44.
108. See Baum, supra note 20, at 1021; see also Conlon, supra note 18, at 289-90.
109. Baum, supra note 20, at 1021; cf King, supra note 14, at 457-58 (suggesting that a
successful approach may be to generalize the claim to the extent that the invasion claimed is similar
to that in a sexual harassment claim).
110. See Conlon, supra note 18, at 289-90.
111. Lee, supra note 15, at 163.
112. Conlon, supra note 18, at 290. "The elements of the tort are similar to the standards used
in determining a Fourth Amendment claim in the public sector." Natt Gantt, supra note 23, at 375.
113. Natt Gantt, supra note 23, at 375.
114. Conlon, supra note 18, at 290.
115. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 15, at 163.
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outcome of11a6 privacy claim typically turns on the employees' expectation
of privacy.
"In practice, courts will first define the scope of an employee's
reasonable expectation of privacy and then balance the employer's
business interest against the employee's individual rights." '17 Courts treat
the workplace environment, the reason for the intrusion, and the means
employed as factors to be considered. 1 ' Ultimately, by communicating an
electronic monitoring policy, the employer can establish the level of
privacy that employees may reasonably expect." 9 In addition, employers
should certainly be able to provide enough legitimate business interests to
justify electronic monitoring."' An employee is not likely to succeed if the
employer obtained information through the employer's own computer
system. 2 1 Sure enough, "[e]ven employees in states that recognize a
common-law cause of action for invasion of privacy have met with little
success in the context of e-mail monitoring."'" In dismissing an employee
action in Bourke v. Nissan Motor Corp., " the court held that employees
had no expectation of privacy, especially since they had "acknowledged
and agreed to the employer's policies providing that use of its computers
was for business purposes only." The employees also acknowledged that
124
they were aware that their e-mail messages were subject to monitoring.
a Pennsylvania court's dismissal of a claim
A more surprising result was
12
in Smyth v. Pillsbury Co. 1
The court in Smyth rejected the employee's claim that his
termination violated "public policy which precludes an
employer from terminating an employee in violation of an
employee's right to privacy" under state common law. The
court also found that by voluntarily communicating allegedly
unprofessional comments to a second person over the
corporate e-mail system, the plaintiff lost any reasonable
expectation of privacy, notwithstanding any assurances that
such communications would not be intercepted by
management. The court further held that, even if the plaintiff
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the context of his
116. Adams et al., supra note 101, at 44.
117. Conlon, supra note 18, at 290.
118. Lois R. Witt, Comment, TerminallyNosy: Are Employers Free to Access OurElectronic
Mail?, 96 DICK. L. REv. 545, 565 (1992).
119. Conlon, supra note 18, at 290.
120. See id.
121. Baum, supra note 20, at 1011, 1020-21.
122. Brown, supra note 77, at 654.
123. No. YC-003979, slip. op. (Cal. Ct. App. June 1993).
124. Brown, supra note 77, at 654.
125. 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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messages, "the company's interest in preventing inappropriate
and unprofessional comments or even illegal activity over its
e-mail system outweighs any privacy interest the employee
may have in these comments."' 26
At common law, then, an employer may insulate itself from liability by
informing employees of a monitoring program. An employer may even
escape liability in the absence of any notification. And, as an example of
the variability in outcomes among the states, Smyth indicates that
employees may not even have the right to electronic privacy when
affirmatively assured by their employer that personal communications will
be kept private.127 Common law has been cited as a good forum for
workplace privacy reform in the absence of legislation. 2 ' However, courts
have been hesitant to put forth the requisite amount ofjudicial activism to
make a substantive change. 29 Besides, the cost of litigation keeps many
cases from reaching an active judge, 30 and the resulting patchwork of laws
also would lack the desired uniformity.'31
E. The FailureofLaw to Provide a Solution in the UnitedStates
As many technologies speed past the law in general, the particular
technologies enabling electronic monitoring in the workplace have
outpaced the legislature's ability' to react with a reasoned solution
Likewise, the common law is so
reflective of society's values.'
entrenched in legal precedent, which inadequately corresponds to the
reality of the "wired" worksite, that it has not been able to respond in a
timely fashion either.'33 Commentators explain the current tension

126. Brown, supra note 77, at 655.
127. See id.
128. Wilborn, supra note 22, at 854.
129. Id
130. New Hazards,supra note 15, at 1915.
131. Wilborn, supra note 22, at 855.
132. Conlon, supra note 18, at 285 ("The rapid growth of workplace monitoring and
surveillance technology has far outpaced the development of laws that protect worker privacy
interests.").
133. Winters, supra note 27, at 93-94. Since "cyberspace" is difficult to experience through
the five senses, it is difficult to expand established laws that dealt with physical privacy to cover
electronic privacy. Id. Furthermore, although not confined to privacy in the workplace, a recent
article by Paul Schwartz explains how the tort law is a flawed scheme for policy protection on the
Internet. Paul Schwartz, PrivacyandDemocracy in Cyberspace,52 VAND.L. REv. 1609, 1669-70
(1999). An excerpt reads:
The necessary consensus about how community members process and share
personal data in cyberspace cannot be left to emerge slowly over time through the
tools of tort law and the push and pull of litigants, judges, and juries. This Article

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol54/iss2/3

16

Kesan: Cyber-Working or Cyber-Shirking?: A First Principles Examination
FIRSTPRINCIPLES EXAMINATION OFELECTRONIC PRIVACYIN THE WORKPLACE

as springing from a temporal gap, representing the lag between the issues
introduced by electronic monitoring and the response to those issues by the
legislatures.'34
Electronic monitoring is an unprecedented phenomenon, giving the
employer an ability to monitor practically every detail of its employees'
workdays at an almost negligible cost. As employers use this capability,
for legitimate and illegitimate purposes alike, one consequence is that
some employees experience additional stress and suffer new indignities.
But another, more subtle, consequence has been the revelation of a legal
reality which is distasteful to many: that there is no independent right to
privacy in the workplace. Therefore, employers have traditionally been
able to reasonably (even secretly) monitor employees. Technological
advances precipitated federal legislation in the form of ECPA; yet ECPA's
statutory ambiguities and Congress's unclear intent vis-h-vis the
employment relationship have left corporate America with plenty of room
to electronically monitor employees, even without notice. With notice,
employees are still exposed to electronic monitoring with very few
limitations. However, the present situation is understandable in light ofthe

has already suggested two problems with privacy-control that also speak to the
weaknesses of Post's reliance on tort litigation. First, the discussion of an
"autonomy trap" indicated that the use of personal data itself helps set the terms
under which we participate in social and political life and the meaning we give to
information-control. As a result, what is "reasonable" privacy and "highly
offensive" information use is not exogenous to social trends regarding data
processing, but rather is likely to reflect closely that which already takes
place ....
Second, the Article pointed to the "data seclusion deception" regarding the
rejection of personal claims for information isolation in favor of the demands of
outside organizations. It argued that courts and academics predictably will favor
collective demands for disclosure over privacy interests framed as an individual
right of control....
These two issues suggest that, given only general privacy tort standards,
judges and juries will create a stable but bad equilibrium about personal data use.
Indeed, as a threshold matter, the common law privacy tort will generate adequate
privacy norms through litigation self-help only when the law provides sufficient
incentives for plaintiffs to bring their claims to court. The incentives for this
volume of tort privacy litigation are not now in place....
Id.
134. See, e.g., Winters, supra note 27, at 130. But see The European Union Data Directive and
Privacy: Before the House Committee on International Relations (May 7,1998) (statement ofMarc
Rotenberg, Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown
University Law Center), available at http://www.epic.orgfprivacy/intllrotenberg-eu-testimony598.html (last visited on Nov. 13, 2001) ("Privacy as a legal right is well established in the United
States, and the United States has passed many privacy laws in response to new technologies.").

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

traditional scope of government regulation and of the evolution of the
concept of privacy in this country.'35
"The American legal tradition eschews a powerful state role in society
and draws on a deep-seated philosophy of limited government .... Even
in the wake of increases in government regulation following the New Deal
and Progressive Eras, U.S. law-making rhetoric remained hostile toward
the regulation of industry."' 36 Privacy is hard to pin down, but that has not
hindered the creation of a wide variety of definitions. 137 American notions
of privacy are historically reflected in the concept of "rugged
individualism."' 38 Privacy has been deemed to be akin to personal
property. 39 Individual autonomy and liberty are prized, 4 ° and no
corresponding debt is owed to the community. 4 ' Accordingly,-the doctrine
of at-will employment is founded upon the right of autonomous parties to
contract freely. During the course of bargaining, each side may exchange,
as consideration, tangible and intangible items that are alienable. In our
system of employment, we can trade our privacy as though it were
something we individually own.'42 It is the alienability of privacy that
allows courts to consider the issues of consent and reasonable expectation
of privacy to be controlling. It is the alienability of privacy that allows an
employer to receive implied consent or to virtually eliminate any
reasonable expectation of privacy by notifying its employees of a
monitoring policy.4 3 It is presumed that an employee in such a situation
44
has accepted monitoring in exchange for continued employment.'
Proposals to alter the employment-at-will doctrine through a public policy
exception for privacy fail as a result of the notion that privacy belongs to

135. But see Rotenberg, supra note 93, at 27 (attacking the argument that government
legislation and protection of privacy rights is "inconsistent with an American tradition" and
attributing the notion of such an American tradition to lobbyists).
136. Joel R. Reidenberg, GoverningNetworksandRule-Makingin Cyberspace,45 EMORYL.J.
911,921 (1996).
137. See generallyNatt Gantt, supra note 23, at 411-15 (comparing Bloustein and Prosser);
Pauline T. Kim, PrivacyRights, PublicPolicy,and the Employment Relationship,57 OHIO ST. L.J.
671, 682-720 (1996) (applying concepts of privacy to tori law and to the workplace); King, supra
note 14, at 444-46 (discussing Flaherty and Gavison); Schnaitman, supra note 29, at 181-82
(discussing Cate and Post).
138. Wilbom, supra note 22, at 834.
139. Rothstein, supra note 15, at 381.
140. See Wilbom, supra note 22, at 834.
141. Rothstein, supra note 15, at 382.
142. See generally id. at 381-83.
143. See generally id. at 382-83.
144. See generally id.
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an individual.' 45 The net result is that none of the traditional sources of
American law guarantees employee privacy in the workplace.
As we will see in the next section, American law in this area is
diametrically opposite to the situation in Europe. American law stands
apart from most of the world, which starts instead from the concept of
dignity.' 46 Our concept of privacy is not shared by most cultures; some do
not even have a word for privacy.'47 Like privacy, human dignity can be
viewed conceptually as a fundamental right. 148 But, unlike privacy, dignity
is not generated from the individual. 49 It is created by one's community
and bestowed upon the individual. 5 ° It cannot be bartered away. 15 In
societies with an operable legal right to dignity, the legal system, to
lines that employers may not cross
various extents, has already established
2
with respect to monitoring.

F. Alternative Examplesfrom Europe
In Europe, the regulation of privacy in the workplace generally draws
from one or more of the following sources of authority: labor law,
regulation of data collection and dissemination, and the protection of
personal communications. For example, the United Kingdom provides a
regulatory regime not far removed from that of the United States, though
British employers are now subject to statutory limitations upon collection
of personal data on their employees. In the following examples, I do not
attempt to exhaustively review the law and regulation of privacy in the
workplace in Europe. Rather, I simply outline the legal sources for
workplace privacy protection in four countries in Europe.
1. United Kingdom
Until recently, British workers, like their American compatriots, lacked
substantive privacy protection. Employers could legitimately monitor and
scrutinize workers' on-line activities, even when these concerned personal

145. Cf. Wilbom, supra note 22, at 859-60. The intrusion into one's privacy has not been

shown to sufficiently impact the community as to warrant a public policy exception. Id. ("[C]ourts
typically have prohibited recovery on this theory when purely 'private' interests are involved....
[Tihird party impacts can rarely be shown."). But cf Kim, supra note 137, at 723 (arguing that the
public policy exception protects sweeping public interest rather than third parties).
146. See Rothstein, supra note 15, at 383.
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id. (linking privacy with property and dignity with citizenship and community).

151. Cf. id. at 394 ("[Italian] law does not allow an individual worker to consent to...
surveillance.").

152. See generally id. at 384-98.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

communications. The Regulation ofInvestigatory Powers Act (RIPA) now
provides legal redress to employees who have had their communications
intercepted by an employer without lawful authority.5 3 Since RIPA
requires that all parties to a communication, including non-employees,
consent to monitoring, employers are more likely to rely upon the ECPAlike exceptions in the regulations promulgated under RJPA.'1 4 It has been
charged that RIPA and the regulations are not in accord with the Human
Rights Act because they do not require that the invasiveness of the
intrusion be proportional to the employer's legitimate need.'55

An employer having lawful authority to intercept communications must
further comply with the Data Protection Act (DPA) if personal employee

information is gathered.'56 Employers who fall into the category of "data
controllers" have a duty to comply with the DPA's eight "data protection
principles," which are similar in tone to the PWCA proposed in the U.S. 57
Unlike employers in France, Germany, and Italy, British employers have

no legal obligation to notify, much less to receive consent from, labor
representatives before commencing
workplace. 5

electronic monitoring in the

2. France
The French Labor Code requires that employers notify labor
representatives or works councils of monitoring in the workplace.'59 The
Labor Code also extends the provisions ofthe Law on Data Processing and
Liberty to the workplace in the prohibition of collection of personal

information on employees without notice. 6 Further, the Commission

153. Regulation of Investigating Powers Act, 2000, c. 23 (Eng.).
154. The Telecommunications (Lawful Business Practice) (Interception of Communications)
Regulations 2000, (2000) SI 2000/2699.
Employers are permitted to monitor and intercept e-mails in order to establish
facts relevant to the business; to ascertain compliance with regulatory or selfregulatory rules or guidance; to ascertain or demonstrate standards which are or
should be achieved by persons using the system in the course of their duties; to
prevent or to detect crime or the unauthorized use of their systems; and to ensure
effective operation of the system (e.g. to detect viruses).
Gillian Morris, English Law, in ON-LINE RIGHTS FOR EMPLOYEES INTHE INFORMATION SOCIETY
125-46 (Roger Blainpain ed., Kluwer Law International 2002).
155. Morris, supra note 154.
156. Data Protection Act 1998, 1998, c. 29 (Eng.).
157. Id.
158. See generally id.
159. Rothstein, supra note 15, at 387.
160. Id.
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Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertes (CNIL) was created by the Law
on Data Processing and Liberty. 6 ' To the extent that they collect data that
can identify an individual, employers must file with the CNIL a description
of the data collected, the legitimate purpose advanced by each use of the
data, and the steps taken to ensure confidentiality.' 62 As a fundamental
right, privacy cannot be trampled by an employer's purely economic
concerns.'63 Article 9 of the Civil Code also speaks to the notion of an
individual's general right to privacy and thereby informs the analysis under
similar laws."' Whereas French legal protections are the province of
bureaucratic agencies, German law facilitates greater involvement with
organized labor, and Italian privacy protection primarily rests with the
unions."'
3. Germany
German privacy protection is rooted in its constitutional concept of
"personality right" which is the protection of dignity against abuse of state
power.'66 Employers can only legitimately interfere with an employee's
right to personality if permitted by legislation, collective agreement;, or if
consent has been obtained from the company works council in the absence
of a collective agreement on the issue. Codified protections are bifurcated,
with the Telecommunications Act'6 7 being applicable if an employer grants
employees personal use of the Internet, and the broader Data Protection
Act'6 8 being applicable ifnot.'69 In general, communications monitoring by
employers without employee consent is prohibited with the very rare
exception of compelling interests of the undertaking or the prevention of
crimes being at stake. 7 0 Unions, where they exist, are granted the power
of "codetermination rights" on privacy issues in the workplace by the

161. Id. at 388.
162. Id.
163. Ministre du Travail v Socidt6 Peintures Corona [1980] 6 Dr. Soc. 317.
164. Rothstein, supra note 15, at 389.
165. Id. at 393.
166. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution], art. I (F.R.G.).
167. des Begleitgesetzes zum Telekommunikationsgesetz (Telekommunikationsgesetz), v.
1.8.1996 (BGBI. I S.1 120) (F.R.G.).
168. Deutsches Bundesdatenshcutzgesetz (German Federal Data Protection Act), v. 27.01.77
(BGBI.I S.201) (F.R.G.).
169. A. Hoeland, Use and Monitoring of E-mail in the Workplace in Germany (unpublished
manuscript on file with The Bulletin of Labour Law and Industrial Relations, Kluwer Law
International).
170. Landesarbeitsgericht Berlin (BAG) [Berlin Labor Court of Appeals] Der Betrieb [DB]
1024 (1988); Andrea Raffler & Peter Hellich, Unter Welchen Voraussetzungen ist die
Oberwachungvon ArbeitnehmerE-mails Zulassig?[Under What Conditions Is the Monitoringof
Employee E-mails Permissible?],NZA 862, 863 (1997).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVWEW

(Vol. 54

Works Constitution Act. 7 1 Stronger still is the power wielded by Italian
labor unions, often overwhelming the right of the individual employee to
consent to remote monitoring.
4. Italy
In adopting the substance of the European Community Directive on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of Such Data, Italy requires not only notice to2
the employee of data collection but also consent from the employee.'
Stemming from an avowed purpose to protect "worker dignity,"' 7 3 Article
4 of the Italian Workers Statute imposes an absolute prohibition on the
remote monitoring of workers. 74 With respect to monitoring for
productivity or safety purposes, which may have the incidental potential
to monitor individuals, Article 4 requires the buy-in of works councils to
permit surveillance of employees. 75 As an indication of the inalienable
nature of dignity, individual employees may not consent to employer
monitoring absent an agreement with the trade union. 76 Not even the
"violation of employer property rights" can empower an employer to
legally monitor employees.
III. EMPLOYEE ACCESS TO E-MAIL AND THE INTERNET AT WORK
In the absence of legal recognition for electronic privacy in the
workplace, the next step is to examine how a market-based solution to the
issue of electronic privacy can be devised. With that objective, in this and
the next sections, I first examine the underlying concerns of employers and
employees regarding access to e-mail and the Internet and electronic
monitoring at the workplace.
A. The Employer's Perspective
Regardless of how e-mail and the Internet are used, employers invite
a host of problems into the workplace when they make use of these tools.

171.

BEFTRIEBSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ

(Works Constitution Act), Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I

§ 13 (1985) (F.R.G.). The Act mandates both employers and works councils to safeguard and
promote the untrammeled development of the personality of employees in the establishment. See
id. § 75(2).
172. Rothstein, supra note 15, at 394.
173. Gino Giugni, Lo Statuto dei Lavoratori[Commentarioof the LaborStatute], Giuffre',
Milano (1979).
174. Rothstein, supra note 15, at 396.
175. Id. at 394.
176. Id.
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Computer security threats, legal liability, and productivity losses may
accompany the benefits of being "wired."
These days, employers have to worry about remote security breaches
from the likes of school-age kids. Internet access alone makes hacking
more likely.'7 7 Also, "[o]ne consequence ofthe increased use of e-mail and
the Internet is that viruses are now capable of spreading many times faster
than ever before."' 78 Unfortunately, "[s]hort of cutting off access to the
Internet, there is no such thing as absolute security in a corporate computer
system."' 79 While worrying about threats from without, managers should
not ignore threats from within. Employees commit more computer crime
against their employers than third parties do. 80 A decade ago, losses were
already mounting to five billion dollars annually. 8 ' Employee crime is not
limited to traditional white-collar embezzlement; sensitive computer
information in the form of trade secrets182 or personnel files can be altered,
disclosed to others, or destroyed.' Unfortunately, the complete scope of
computer crime perpetrated on corporations may never be known.
Concerned about exposing their vulnerability to customers and to other
criminals, executives are hesitant to report such crime.'
Of greater concern to many employers is the legal liability that may
attach to a company from both the business and personal online activities
of its employees.' 85 Via the recent expansion of the strict liability doctrine
of respondeat superior, an employer may be held strictly liable for the
foreseeable torts and crimes of employees. 8 6 There is little evil under the
177. Stuart Rosove, Employee Internet Use and Employer Liability, 1997 ANDREWS EM'.
LITG. REP. 22106.
178. Diana J.P. McKenzie, Information Technology Policies: Practical Protection in
Cyberspace, 3 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 84, 99 (1997).
179. RICHARD RAYSMAN ET AL., MULTIMEDIA LAW: FoRMs & ANALYSIS § 10.08 (2001).
180. New Hazards,supra note 15, at 1899-1900 (noting that employees are more likely to
commit multiple crimes over long periods of time without detection).
181. Id. at 1900.
182. Thomas P. Klein, Electronic Communications in the Workplace: Legal Issues and
Policies,in THIRD ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE 720 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks,
and Literary Property Course Hand Book Series No. GO-005 1, 1999). See generally Ari B. Good,
Trade Secrets andthe New Realitiesof the InternetAge, 2 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 51 (1998)
(discussing the ease with which a trade secret can be destroyed over the Internet).
183. New Hazards,supra note 15, at 1900.
184. Id. at 1902.
185. See generally Ishman, supra note 4, at * 19-76 (expounding upon the circumstances in
which employers may be liable for employee stock manipulation, "cybersmearing," copyright and

trademark violations, misappropriation of trade secrets, viruses, worms, and gambling book
operations).
186. John Edward Davidson, Reconciling the Tension Between Employer Liability and
Employee Privacy, 8 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 145, 147 (1997); see also Ishman, supra note

4, at 12-18 (demonstrating that the traditional "scope of employment" element of liability has
expanded to include all acts of which an employer knows or should know).
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electronic sun that cannot be accomplished without the use of e-mail or the
Internet, but it is clear that mischief can be facilitated and exacerbated by
these electronic tools. For example, the new electronic mediums facilitate
some illegal business practices, such as the deliberate interception of
competitors' secrets.' 87 The ease of creating electronic communications
and their irretrievable nature compound the risk of losing control of
confidential information.'88 Consider the following examples in which
liability may arise from a breach of computer security:
(1) A hospital that discloses confidential medical information of a patient
may be liable to that patient.' 89
(2) A publicly traded company can run afoul of securities laws for leaking
confidential information.' 90
Traditional torts, like defamation, may be amplified; the potential for
harm through the Internet is greater due to the potential for wider
dissemination. 9 ' Likewise, the Internet makes employee copyright
infringement easier and more likely. 92
' An employee may not know that the
multitude of electronic documents at her fingertips is copyrighted. 193 And,
since more and more software developers are turning to patent protection
for their computer code, patent infringement is likely when an employee
downloads a program. The proliferation of sexually graphic material on the
Internet raises the specter of criminal obscenity charges, especially with
regards to child pornography. The Internet further compounds the problem
by largely erasing geographic and jurisdictional boundaries. It is easier to
retrieve obscene material that is not considered obscene at its point of
origin.' 94 Vise versa, an employee may generate or send material that is not
obscene where the employee sits but is so in many of the jurisdictions of
the potential receivers.' 95 An employer may also receive unwanted
publicity when employees visit "inappropriate" Web sites.' 96 "Upon

187. Rosove, supra note 177.
188. Rogers, supra note 5, at 6 ("[E]-mail is misdirected frequently enough to cause
concern.").
189. McKenzie, supra note 178, at 94.
190. Id.
191. Rosove, supra note 177.

192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Frank C. Morris, Jr., The ElectronicPlatform and CriticalEmployment Related Issues
in the New Millennium, in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE--AMERICANBAR ASSOCIATION CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: CuRRENT DEVELOPMENTS INEMPLOYMENT LAW
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entering the site, the employee's 'domain name' often illustrates the name
of the employer, which may be captured."'97 Given the challenges to
federal electronic "decency" acts, offensive material is more likely to be
the source of a claim of discrimination by contributing to the formation of
a hostile work environment.'98
The nature of electronic tools may facilitate offensive behavior and
certainly increases the life span of offensive written material.'99
E-mail use has exploded, primarily because it is fast and easy
to use.... These attributes also may [be] some of e-mail's
biggest shortcomings. [Since e-mail is seen to be] less
formal[,] ... senders have devoted less attention to what is
being written. More personal means that senders may include
confidential, offensive or sensitive information, believing that
they are sending private, intimate message[s] for the
recipients' eyes only.2"
An employee may write things in an e-mail that would never be written in
an internal memo.2 ' Or, an employee may send the e-mail to an
unintended recipient.0 2 Or, the intended recipient may pass it along to an
audience never intended by the author. 3 With regard to "surfing" the
Web, an employee's visits to offensive sites may "result in a lawsuit or
appear as evidence in a lawsuit." 2 ' The permanence of electronic
documents, and employees' ignorance ofthat permanence, is also troubling
to employers.
[U]nlike paper documents that can be shredded, computer
files can survive long after they have been "deleted" from the
system. The data remains undisturbed until more space is
needed on the hard drive and then the file may be overwritten.
No user can predict when, or if, a deleted file will be
overwritten. Destroying an e-mail message is particularly
difficult due to the fact that numerous copies may exist. 0 5

1071, 1074 (July 27, 2000).
197. Id.; see also Rogers, supranote 5, at 5 (calling the records left behind, "cookies" or
"mouse droppings").
198. Rosove, supra note 177.
199. Id.
200. Adams et al., supranote 101, at 33.
201. Rosove, supra note 177.
202. See Rogers, supra note 5, at 6 ("[El-mail is misdirected frequently enough to cause
concern.").
203. See id.
204. Morris, supra note 196, at 1073.
205. Brown, supranote 77, at 661-62.
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Employers must worry about all these "time bombs" lurking in their
computer networks because e-mail communications are legally
discoverable." 6
More pervasive than legal liability is the loss of productivity from
personal use of e-mail and the Internet. Personal use does not have to be
mischievous to cause harm. Time spent on personal business is time not
spent working. "This is a new spin on the old nuisance of employees
making personal phone calls at work, but with greatly magnified
possibilities.... [T]he Web can be extremely seductive, lulling users to
click screen after screen for hours at a time." 0 7 "According to one poll,
almost one-fourth of an employee's time spent on-line is on nonworkrelated activities."20 8 Further studies show that employees "with on-line
access spend up to 10 hours per week sending personal e-mail or visiting
Internet sites unrelated to work."2' 9 Unproductive employees are the source
of a litany of negative results: poor customer service, lost business,
unnecessary overstaffing, high overheads, and lost profits.21 ° In addition to
hurting productivity, unnecessary broadcasts of personal e-mail to wide
distribution lists also keep employee attention from urgent business emails.2 ' Even when electronic tools are being used for business purposes,
"[e]mployees often face 'e-mail overload' brought on by the overuse and
abuse of212
the 'forwarding' and 'courtesy copying' features of the e-mail
system."
Another direct hit to the bottom line is the investment required to
relieve the pressure that personal use puts on a company's scarce
transmission bandwidth. 2 3 Large amounts of traffic are generated by
inappropriate personal use and can slow network response.2" 4 For example,
"employees often use their business Internet connection to download slowtransferring, data-heavy files, rather than using their home Internet
connection. ' ' 2 1 Slower response means wasted time and may require an
expensive network upgrade. 216 Another apparently innocuous personal use
is employees shopping online at work. However, "excessive junk e-mail

206.
207.
21, 1999,
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Baum, supra note 20, at 1014-15.
Michael J. McCarthy, VirtualMorality: A New Workplace Quandry, WALL ST. J., Oct.
atB1.
Morris, supra note 196, at 1071.
Rogers, supra note 5, at 20.
Morris, supra note 196, at 1071.
Klein, supra note 182, at 715.
McKenzie, supra note 178, at 98.
Morris, supra note 196, at 1072-73.
Id.
Klein, supra note 182, at 714.
Morris, supra note 196, at 1072-73.
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online shopping could clog a company's server and cause it to
created2by
17
crash."
It is evident that a rational employer will take affirmative steps to
eliminate the risks inherent in being "wired." Eliminating liability by
eliminating all employee access to the Internet and e-mail is not an
economically attractive alternative. A company might as well throw all its
computers in a dumpster. Employers could electronically or procedurally
protect themselves in various ways. One mild example, among many, is
Smith Barney, which is looking at ways to block access to hate sites.218 A
much more extreme solution is to prohibit all personal use of e-mail and
the Internet in the workplace. And one may ask, why not? After all, are not
the networks, the computers, and, as some would argue, the employees'
time at work all owned by the employer?
B. The Employee's Perspective
If only the downside of allowing employees personal use of e-mail and
the Internet were considered, most employers would certainly balk.
However, there are a number of practical justifications for granting some
degree of access to electronic workplace tools for "appropriate" personal
activities. For one, use of e-mail and the Internet enhances an employee's
computer skills, which are then applied to work.21 9 Accordingly, some
companies believe that personal use leads to a net increase in
productivity.220 Productivity is also affected by intangible variables, such
as employee morale. "[S]ome incidental personal use of the Internet is
likely to improve employee morale.., and cement employee loyalty. 22'
Perhaps the reverse situation is easier to visualize. "Blocking Net access
has a negative effect on employee morale.., as employees are likely to
feel they are being treated as children. 22 Worse yet prohibiting personal
use can seem extremely arbitrary and can seriously harm morale in
personal emergency situations.223 Imagine a concerned parent who is
prohibited from checking on a sick child by a draconian company policy.

217. Adams et al., supra note 101, at 34.
218. Rosove, supra note 177.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Michael J. Morse & Charles P. Magyera, Internet Use Policies,GP SOLO & SMALL FIRM
L., Apr./May 1999, at 53.
222. Sindy J. Policy, The Employer asMonitor: Keeping an Eye on Net Use andE-mails Can
Prevent Litigation, Bus. L. TODAY, Nov./Dec. 2000, at 11.
223. Lawrence A. Michaels & Lee Anne Steinberg, Employer MonitoringofE-Mail, Voice
Mail, Computer Records, and OtherElectronic InformationSystems-A PracticalApproach, in
DRAFTING EMPLOYMENT DOCUMENTS INMASSACHUSETTS § 10. 11. 1(d) (Mass. Continuing Legal
Education ed., Supp. 1998).
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Though it might seem proper to deny use of a company's
system for the employee's personal affairs, as a practical
matter, it is virtually impossible for an employee to avoid
using message systems for some nonbusiness matters, such as
communications with family or friends on an important
matter or the arrangement of social engagements with other
employees.
So, it is counterproductive to "criminalize" such activities, and indeed, "it
is unrealistic for a company, particularly a large company, to expect all
employees to refrain from any personal use of communications
systems. 225
In addition, it may also be unnecessary for a company to concern itself
with the potential effect of personal use on productivity, particularly when
the employee is salaried.
[A company wants] to cut off excessive time on the Internet
for hourly employees because if they are spending three hours
daily on the Internet, they might be working overtime for
three hours at time-and-a-half to get their jobs done.... But
salaried employees are supposed to get their work done
regardless. So as long as [salaried employees] get their work
done, it is not a problem.... A company shouldn't care
whether employees spend one or 10 hours on the Internet as
long as they are getting their jobs done-and provided that
they are not accessing inappropriate sites or harassing others.
It is probably better that the employer stay away from the
issue. Otherwise, it might lose an incredibly productive
employee.226
Further practical considerations have led most companies to allowsome
personal activity. A company policy only controls employees; employers
with e-mail systems cannot prohibit non-employees from sending personal
e-mails to its employees.22 Certainly, companies may implement
technological measures to filter e-mail or to block access to certain Web
sites; however, "blocking may also inadvertently prevent employees from
checking legitimate, work-related Web sites.122 The challenge of
discerning what material is good from what material is bad extends to the
224. Trubow, supra note 78, at 41-42.
225. Rogers, supranote 5, at 20.
226. Michael A. Verespej, InappropriateInternetSurfing,INDUSTRYWK., Feb. 7,2000, at 58,
available at 2000 WL 10594758.
227. Michaels & Steinberg, supra note 223, at 10.11.1(d).
228. Policy, supra note 222, at 11.
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traditional management function of supervising employee activities. In the
information age, employers can no longer monitor operations by looking
over the shoulders of line workers. 9 Consequently, without some form of
electronic monitoring, "it can be extremely difficult to distinguish between
the employee who is busy working at his computer and the employee who
is busy searching the Internet for the latest sports scores, weather reports,
or worse, sexually explicit materials."'23 Thus, the same characteristic of
the electronic workplace that necessitates that employees be given access
to the Internet also requires that a company exert some new measure of
control. But, electronic monitoring by employers disturbs the delicate
balance between an employer's right to conduct business and an
employee's right to privacy.
IV. ELECTRONIC MONITORING IN THE WORKPLACE
The modem, wired workplace is an interesting forum for privacy
analysis. "Two competing interests exist in the employment context: the
employer's right to conduct business in a self-determined manner is
matched against the employee's privacy interests or the right to be let
alone."23 '
A. Employer's Argumentsfor ElectronicMonitoring
Monitoring employees is not new. Society has long recognized the
practical necessity of allowing employers to supervise their employees.
Employers monitor employees to get a fair day's work232 and to protect
company assets. 3 In the Nineteenth Century, Frederick Taylor built an
entire discipline, Scientific Management, around monitoring. 4 The main
difference between the monitoring of the past and that of today is the form
it takes; in years past a person would look over the shoulder of an
employee2 35 while modem employers have the assistance of computers. On
the other hand, once computer technology is made available in the
workplace, it is a double-edged sword. Technology can be used, perhaps
in unauthorized ways, by employees to check up on their superior's ecorrespondence and other activities. For instance, in a recent episode in the

229. Hash & Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 896-97.
230. Klein, supra note 182, at 714.
231. Baum, supra note 20, at 1012.
232. Lee, supra note 15, at 145.
233. Hash & Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 897 ("[W]hat takes place on company premises, over
company phones and company E-mail networks, belongs to the company which has the right to
access that work product.").
234. See Boehmer, supra note 2, at 766.
235. Lee, supra note 15, at 143.
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United States, some employees hacked into their superior's computer and
discovered communications among senior management in the company
discussing the imminent shutdown of a factory, even though the employees
were told that no shutdown was forthcoming.236
While technology may hurt productivity and generate liability at one
end of the equation, it may also provide the solution through cutting edge
monitoring.237 Electronic monitoring allows employers to make significant
gains in the areas of productivity, quality, and safety. Monitoring enhances
productivity by facilitating more efficient resource scheduling, more
immediate feedback,238 and more meaningful evaluations.239 Quality
likewise is improved, and customers benefit from better service and lower
prices.24 ° Monitoring is key to some safety initiatives,24 and better safety
means lower insurance premiums and workers' compensation pay-outs.242
Payroll and equipment costs can also be reduced by monitoring employees
for personal use of company equipment and for taking excessive breaks.243
It has been estimated that employees wasted 170 billion dollars of
employer time in one year alone.244 Further savings may be realized by
curbing theft and legal liability.245
In one year, it is estimated that employees stole the equivalent of 370
billion dollars from their employers. 46 Monitoring can be used to detect
illegal or wrongful deeds so that the offenders may be punished. For
example, the data flow in and out of a company can be watched to find
employees transmitting sensitive data or hackers attempting to crack into
the system. 247 E-mail within the workplace also can be monitored to detect

236. See infra notes 288-89.
237.
The productivity lost and the increasing efforts of the plaintiffs' bar to sue
employers based upon allegations of employee misconduct . . . [has greatly
increased the need for monitoring] the conduct of employees and life in the
workplace.... [I]t is not unreasonable to expect employers to use any and all
available technologies to monitor employees' conduct.
Adams et al., supra note 101, at 35.
238. Shefali N. Baxi & Alisa A. Nickel, Big Brother or Better Business: Striking a Balance
in the Workplace, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 137, 139 (1994).
239. Boehmer, supra note 2, at 745.
240. Baxi & Nickel, supra note 238, at 139.
241. See Flanagan, supra note 85, at 1262.
242. Boehmer, supra note 2, at 747.
243. Id. at 746.
244. Flanagan, supra note 85, at 1261 n.33.
245. Id. at 1261.
246. Id.
247. Baxi & Nickel, supra note 238, at 140.
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electronic harassment.24 Alternately, monitoring may be used proactively
to minimize respondeatsuperior liability to detect a problem before it
happens.249 As a final incentive, the law sometimes requires employers to
monitor employees.'
Employers do not have to monitor electronically, but they
overwhelmingly choose electronic monitoring for a number of compelling
reasons. First, it is often the lowest cost alternative, certainly lower than
human supervisors doing the same task."' It is also accurate as only a
computer could be, and, in the main, it is free of human biases. 2 Finally,
the social landscape is primed for it. The economy has shifted from manual
manufacturing to automated service industries,253 like data processing,
which is tailor-made for electronic monitoring. Union influence is
declining, and along with it, a major opponent of electronic monitoring. 4
Most importantly, the employment-at-will doctrine allows employers to
make employee submission to electronic monitoring as a condition of
continued employment, and counter-balancing legal limitations are almost
non-existent. 55
B. Employee's Arguments Against ElectronicMonitoring
Employees are concerned about the effects of monitoring, and
employers should take note of the consequential effects on the workplace.
An employee may suffer loss of self-esteem if she interprets the
monitoring to indicate a lack of trust in her. 6 Employees may also
question the fairness of the monitoring: are the right variables being
measured; are the wrong variables being measured; is the measurement
accurate? 2 7 Fairness is also suspect considering that women and minorities
receive a disproportionate amount of monitoring, as they make up a large
percentage of the clerical ranks.258 Worse, monitoring may be abused by
the employer to intimidate and punish employees rather than help them

248. Kopp, supra note 36, at 864.
249. When employees build symbolic walls around themselves in an attempt to gain privacy
in the workplace, sometimes employers must employ monitoring tactics which crack the
employees' shell of concealment to detect future problems for which the company may be liable.
See Davidson, supra note 186, at 147-48.
250. Baxi & Nickel, supra note 238, at 140 (citing Federal Sentencing Guidelines and FTC
consent decrees as two sources of legal mandates to monitor).
251. See id. at 139; see also Boehmer, supra note 2, at 765.
252. Flanagan, supranote 85, at 1260.
253. Boehmer, supra note 2, at 763.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Flanagan, supranote 85, at 1264.
257. Boehmer, supra note 2, at 771-72.
258. Baxi & Nickel, supra note 238, at 140.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

improve." 9 Abuse may also take the form of voyeurism,26 union-busting,
ferreting out whistleblowers,261 and creating pretenses to fire members of
protected employee groups.
The accumulation of the above effects "takes its toll on workers and
companies in terms of stress, fatigue, apprehension, motivation, morale,
and trust; this results in increased absenteeism, turnover, poorer
management, and lower productivity, not to mention higher health-care
costs. ' 262 Thus, monitoring may spoil the workplace environment, and it
can have a detrimental effect on productivity.263 Productivity is harmed by
the mental and physical manifestations of stress: depression and anxiety, 26
including "wrist, arm, shoulder, neck, and back problems., 261 It is
estimated that employee stress costs employers fifty to seventy-five billion
dollars annually.266 Monitoring can also encourage employees to act in a
counterproductive manner 267 in an attempt to "game" 268 the system.
Alternatively, employees may decide to avoid the use of e-mail
altogether.269 Some employees are concerned that electronic monitoring
will allow employers to increase the pace of work, creating sweatshops,
not unlike those before the advent of progressive labor laws.270
Unconditional acceptance ofelectronic monitoring also threatens the future
of privacy in the workplace. "[E]mployees, unions and advocacy
groups.., fear that without some restrictions on an employer's ability to
monitor e-mail, privacy protection will all but disappear from the
workplace, resulting in an 'electronic sweatshop' where constant
monitoring takes place. 271
In their path-breaking article on the right to privacy published in 1890,
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis presaged the effect that technology
would have on privacy in the workplace: "Recent inventions and business

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. at 141.
Lee, supra note 15, at 144.
Boehmer, supra note 2, at 743.
Lee, supra note 15, at 144.
Baxi & Nickel, supra note 238, at 142.
Flanagan, supra note 85, at 1263.
Baxi & Nickel, supra note 238, at 141.
Flanagan, supra note 85, at 1264.

267. Id. at 1275-78.

268. Boehmer, supra note 2, at 772.
269. Cf Natt Gantt, supra note 23, at 422 (predicting that, short of not using e-mail,
employees might not be as candid, thus increasing miscommunication).
270. Boehmer, supra note 2, at 808 ("Secret monitoring is the merciless electronic whip that
drives the fast pace of today's workplace in the service industry. In essence, concealed surveillance
combines the worst features of 19th century factory labor relations with 20th century technology,
creating an electronic sweatshop." (quoting COMM.WORKERS OF AM., Legis. Fact Sheet No. 101-22, Secret Monitoring 1-2 (1990))).
271. Adams et al., supra note 101, at 34.
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methods call attention to the next step which must be taken for the
protection of the person, and for securing to the individual... the right 'to
be let alone.",'21 Though electronic monitoring is relatively new,
workplace privacy disputes are not. Over the years, a certain right to
privacy in the workplace has been carved out for employees in physical,
personal mail and in lockers and desks. The similarity between e-mail and
computer file cabinets has many commentators calling for equivalent
privacy rights in e-mail.273
Some of the inherent characteristics of e-mail and computer storage
give the appearance of traditional mail and physical storage. As with
traditional mail, e-mail appears to be a private mode of communication;
the recipients are chosen by the author, and there is no indication of
"default" recipients. Thus, an employee may expect privacy for e-mail that
is intended to be private. 274 This is the case with traditional mail. In
Vernars v. Young,27 the court stated that "private individuals.., have a
reasonable expectation that their personal mail will not be opened and read
by unauthorized persons;', 276 so, an employer may not open an employee's
personal mail.277
Also, the security measures applied to workplace computers and
networks may also give the impression that computers are like personal
desks or lockers. The holding in K-Mart v. Trotti2 78 represents the general
rule that "[e]mployees generally have a right to privacy in items locked in
a desk, file cabinet, or locker if their employer does not require them to
provide their supervisor with a duplicate copy of the key or combination
necessary to open the lock., 279 "The use of confidential passwords and not
readily identifiable user names may lead employees to believe that their email and internet postings are confidential or anonymous, and that they
have a right to privacy in such electronic communications.""28 "Courts
could easily view mailserver's memory as a locker or file cabinet and the
password as a lock."'28 This point of view, however, is not pervasive. Thus,
employees have a vested interest in how courts interpret the law of the land
as applied to e-mail.

272. Samuel D. Warren& Louis D. Brandeis, The Right toPrivacy,4HARv.L.REv. 193, 195

(1890).
273. Lee, supra note 15, at 144.
274. Schnaitman, supra note 29, at 202-03.
275. 539 F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1976).

276. Id. at 969.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Beeson, supra note 42, at 213.
677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
Beeson, supranote 42, at 214-15.
Brown, supra note 77, at 647.
Beeson, supra note 42, at 214.
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V. GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN FASHIONING A SOLUTION

As we have seen earlier, in the U.S., neither statutory law nor the
common law recognizes a zone of privacy in the workplace. Some
progressive academics, such as Anita Allen, urge that an emphasis on
creating a zone of privacy in the workplace works against the interests of
women seeking to be free from sexual harassment and gender-related
misconduct in the workplace.2" 2 Further, unlike in some European
countries, in the United States, no universal right to privacy or human
dignity has been established, and therefore, the government lacks a
fundamental instrument to fashion a privacy zone at work. In the future,
perhaps Congress or the courts will step in and vindicate privacy interests
in the workplace. When federal appellate and district court judges,
including Judge Alex Kozinski and Judge James Rosenbaum, discovered
that all their online activity was being monitored by the Administrative
Office of the Courts, an angry response followed, and a subsequent review
of court system administrative procedures was sought. This provides hope
that, in the future, courts might step in to limit employer monitoring of
their computer networks.2" 3 But, given our past record in this area, that
possibility is remote. However, legal remedies are not the only option. The
market has a role to play in crafting a solution that addresses the differing,
and perhaps conflicting, interests at work.
In this section, I propose a contractarian solution to the problem of
electronic privacy in the workplace that maximizes the interests (i.e., the
payoffs) of both employers and employees. Relying on insights from
microeconomic, principal-agent models, I show that it is possible to define
an e-policy contract for the workplace that is compatible with the
incentives of employees and employers by incorporating the following
principles into the contract: (a) participation by employers and employees
in jointly defining workplace e-policies, and employee commitment to
adhere to these commonly-defined e-policies; (b) full disclosure by
282. Anita L. Allen, The Wanted Gaze:AccountabilityforInterpersonalConduct at Work, 89

GEO. L.J. 2013, 2027 (2001) (advising that women must cooperate with employers and permit
responsible, privacy-sensitive monitoring at work).
283. See Ted Bridis &Glenn R. Simpson, Judges'IreStirsDebate on Web Monitoring,WALL

ST. J., Aug. 9, 2001, at B9 (noting that a dispute within the federal judiciary over Internet use
provides hope that federal laws on employee monitoring of company computer networks might
change); Neil A. Lewis, Rebels in Black Robes atSurveillance of Computers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8,

2001, at Al (noting that Chief Judge Mary Schroeder of the Ninth Circuit was "concerned about
the propriety and even the legality of monitoring Internet usage"); Carl S. Kaplan, Reconsidering
the Privacy of Office Computers, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2001), at http://www.nytimes.com/
2001/07/27/ techn (stating that Judge James M. Rosenbaum, Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Minnesota, expressed uneasiness over the proposition that employers may freely
rummage through employee computers at work).
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employers of implementation measures, in accordance with these epolicies; and (c) implementation measures to include monitoring of
employers to ensure compliance with e-policies. As discussed below, I
show that such a contract maximizes the benefits and reduces the losses
that accrue to both employers and employees.
A. Applying Principal-AgentTheory to Electronic
Privacy in the Workplace
The Internet at the workplace helps workers improve their productivity,
especially in those activities related to information gathering or processing.
It is also useful to those businesses embarking on online commercialization
of their products. In these cases, the existence of the Internet is key to the
normal development of their business activities. But, workers can access
the Internet, not only for work-related tasks, but also for personal reasons.
The latter use could diminish workplace productivity.284 Thus, it is an
objective of the employer to: (a) reasonably limit personal use of the
Internet by employees; (b) forbid certain other uses of the Internet, such as
seeking adult entertainment or harassing fellow employees; and (c)
encourage Internet use for work-related activities.
The situation described above can be related to the familiar principalagent problem in microeconomic theory." 5 Here, the employer is the
principal and the employee is the agent. In this model, the principal expects
some level of effort by the agent in order to attain a desired level of output.
For the agent, work impacts his utility function negatively, and so he will
try to cheat on the principal and supply a lower level of effort. It is in the
agent's interest to supply the least amount of work to attain the expected
level of output, assuming that this output can be verified by the principal.
In short, the agent is assumed to be work-averse and risk-averse. 2 6 The
agent also has private information, for example, knowledge about
computer systems at work, that the principal cannot get access to without
incurring some cost, i.e., paying some compensation or rent to the agent for
such information. The problem of the principal is that she cannot observe
the amount of work-related effort that the agent expends, except through
other signals. These signals are not necessarily related to the agent's true
level of effort, and it could even be misleading. The optimal solution to
this problem is for the principal to offer a contract that is compatible with

284. See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
285. For a good introduction to principal-agent models, including problems and criticisms of
this approach, see Stanley Baiman, Agency Research in ManagerialAccounting:A Second Look,
15 ACCOUNTING ORG. & SOC. 341, 342-46 (1990) or Andrei Shliefer & Robert W. Vishny, A
Survey of CorporateGovernance, 52 J. OF FINANCE 737, 740-48 (1997).
286. Baiman, supranote 285, at 343.
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both the agent's and her own incentives. Such an optimal contract would
leave the agent indifferent, or better off, between supplying the right
amount of effort and not doing so. In principal-agent theory, a fully
cooperative solution is not attained because both parties are motivated by
their own self-interests. Instead, the goal is to formulate an optimal
contract that provides an incentive-compatible solution, thereby
maximizing the payoffs to both principal and agent. Finally, the principal
can monitor or control the agent's activities and penalize the agent in case
of no compliance with the required effort or desired output.
These principal-agent models and their optimal solutions are easy to
implement in traditional work environments, but they turn out to be more
complex with the Internet due to the following characteristics.
First, easy access to the Internet makes it quite difficult for the principal
to supervise and control the activities of the agent."' For example, it is
more difficult for the employer to control Internet activities and monitor
for excessive or forbidden Internet use compared to the use of an office
phone. While the principal's costs of control or monitoring may be reduced
by the use of new technology and computers, this new technology is also
available to the agents who may use it to avoid being detected. Thus,
information technology advances are available to both parties and controls
are easier to avoid. 88
Second, computer network interconnections with the outside world
makes it difficult to control incoming and outgoing flow of information
both to and from the firm. As a result, confidential business information
can be easily transferred to the competition using the Internet, and these
violations can be hard to detect in a timely fashion.28 9
Third, the Internet opens up multiple opportunities for any person to
increase her utility. Therefore, completely prohibiting Internet use can
undermine worker effort and reduce productivity even more than the case
when some Internet use is permitted. The new technology gives users a
new world to explore and interact with and enables new and different
transactions. Therefore, agents are likely to achieve higher levels of utility
compared to using telephone or fax machines. As a whole, the use of the
Internet increases productivity and enhances the operating efficiency of
firms. This high level of utility that is derived from Internet use can also

287. See Michelle Conlin & Alex Salkever, Revenge ofthe DownsizedNerds, Bus. WK., July
30,2001, at40 (noting that companies are vulnerable to employee computer sabotage and quoting
FBI estimates that each insider computer attack costs on average $2.7 million).
288. See id. (noting that employees are seeking revenge on former employers and companies
are fighting back with their own measures).
289. See Edmund Tee, More to Fearfrom StaffThan Hackers, THE STRAITS TImEs, Jan. 26,
2001 (citing a U.S. Computer Security Institute and FBI survey showing that seven out often times,
a company's intellectual property is stolen by its employees).
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make agent compensation and control too expensive, or prohibitive, for
some firms.
Fourth, use of the Internet expands workplace productivity, but normal
standards for performance have yet to be developed. Since the Internet is
still growing and multiple uses are being created all the time, it is difficult
to establish some parameter for productivity. Most of the existing
productivity parameters are obtained from tasks done under traditional
technologies. Thus, it is difficult to measure the effort at work through
signals that the agent sends to the principal. This increases the probability
of cheating by the agent and also increases the probability of error in the
principal's evaluation of the agent's efforts.
Fifth, the use of the Internet can take power away from managers and
distribute it to the workers. This result is derived from all the factors
mentioned above. In addition, the decentralized and non-geographic
characteristics of the Internet make it difficult for an entity to centrally
control its operations, thereby further reducing the power of the principal.
In sum, the introduction of the Internet into the workplace has the
following effects:29
• Difficulty in establishing control over the activities of the
agent
• Difficulty in controlling flow of information to and from
the firm
" Higher levels of efficiency and utility derived from
Internet use in the workplace
• Difficulty in establishing productivity standards and
measures to evaluate agent performance
" Loss of the principal's power and lesser ability to take
effective, unilateral action.
Given the new characteristics derived from the presence of the Internet at
work, there are new and greater incentives for both principal and agent to

290. Consideration must also be given to the limitations on choice that are imposed by the very
nature of the Internet. Cf Paul M. Schwartz, InternetPrivacyandthe State, 32 CONN. L. REv. 815,
822-23 (2000).
Beyond information asymmetries and the collective action problem, another
limitation on the choice-making of individuals in cyberspace concerns bounded
rationality. In particular, when faced with standardized terms, individuals left by
privacy-control to fend for themselves will frequently accept whatever industry
offers them. As scholarship in behavioral economics has demonstrated,
consumers' general inertia toward default terms is a strong and pervasive
limitation on free choice.
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design an optimal contract that is compatible with both their self-interests.
The Internet increases the transaction costs of establishing a contingent
contract given the numerous ways that an agent can avoid employer
controls, the easy access to vital information, and the higher utility derived
from personal access to the Internet. It thus raises the possibility of moving
away from purely self-interested behavior and reaching for a tacitly
cooperative solution between the principal and agent. The transaction costs
of achieving such a contractual solution between the principal and agent
may be lower and more efficient in the new context.
The principal, i.e., the employer, may eliminate the negative effects
from Internet use at work by not wiring the workplace, but that option is
costly for the employer since she loses all the economic benefits and
competitive advantages derived from using the Internet in her company.
The agent may also seek higher compensation to join such a workplace.
Finally, the agent may, nevertheless, be able to evade the employer's rules
by accessing the Internet during work hours using palmtop or personal
communicator devices with wireless Internet connections.
The agent, i.e., the employee, can create a zone of privacy by
completely avoiding any personal use of the Internet at work. But this is
costly to the employee since it creates significant inconvenience and may
result in some monetary loss as well. Surreptitiously accessing the Internet
in a draconian workplace without computer access is also not beneficial to
the agent as he has to deal with the fear and uncertainty of being detected
and punished for his conduct.
Consequently, it may be possible to achieve a lower-cost, economically
efficient solution to the problem of electronic privacy in the workplace that
is based on an incentive-compatible agreement between the parties. The
guiding principles for such an optimal contract between the principal (i.e.,
employer) and agent (i.e., employee) that develops mutual trust are:
(a) Participation by employers and employees in jointly
defining workplace e-policies, and employee commitment
to adhere to these commonly-defined e-policies;
(b) Full disclosure of implementation measures, in accordance
with these e-policies; 9 ' and
(c) Implementation measures to include monitoring of
employers to ensure compliance with e-policies.

291. Although a large percentage of firms that monitor employees' online activities disclose
that fact, see 2001 AMA Survey, supra note 9 and accompanying text, it is unclear to what extent
they disclose and clarify permissible, excessive, and forbidden uses of the Internet and also reveal
the details of their monitoring activities and tracking schemes.
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Specifically, the agreement between the principal and the agent should
contain the following: The principal recognizes that the Internet increases
the agent's utility, and therefore, she must define prohibited and excessive
uses of the Internet in consultation with the agent or other representatives
of the agent and seek the agent's buy-in with respect to those e-policies.
The details regarding Internet use in the workplace must be specified, and
the agent and the principal must commit to following these e-policies. In
order to avoid misuse, since the agent still has an incentive to cheat or free
ride against other workers, a level of monitoring or control will be
established.
This contract maximizes the expected payoffs for both principal and
agent. The employer's benefits are as follows: (a) enhancing the firm's
competitiveness by employing the Internet at work; (b) controlling the
agent's use ofhis superior informationthrough monitoring for compliance;
and (c) permitting enforcement of e-policies by putting the agent on notice
and by obtaining the agent's buy-in and commitment to these e-policies.
The employee's benefits are as follows: (a) participating in fashioning epolicies, thereby ensuring that his point of view is heard and
accommodated; (b) enhancing his utility through some personal Internet
use at work; and (c) avoiding a workplace environment governed by fear,
uncertainty, and doubt (i.e., a FUD regime). The employer would rather
not have to suffer some economic loss arising from employees' personal
Internet use, and the employee would rather not be subject to electronic
monitoring at work. But these losses are far outweighed by the benefits
arising from the incentive-compatible, contractual solution outlined above.
Furthermore, by defining such a contract informed by these principles,
the agents know what the company expects from them, and they also know
that they can use the Internet for specific, non-work related purposes.
Therefore, it is optimal for them to offer the requisite quantity of effort in
order to avoid being caught, fired, or sanctioned and to adhere to the rules
governing non-work related Internet use. Since some personal use is
permitted, employees have no incentive to expend resources ih masking
personal activities, and therefore, control or monitoring costs accrued by
the principal are expected to decrease. Indeed, employees may penalize
each other for bad behavior or for deviations from the norm. Since high
levels of deviation from the set standards or cheating can result in a stricter
regime or a return to a less desirable scheme, employees can collude292in
order to denounce or penalize those who deviate from the agreement.

292. This result is attainable as long as the agreement makes everybody better off than a
strictly non-cooperative, principal-agent contract. This is especially true if the expected utility from
cheating today and then being penalized later is lower than not cheating at all. If enough employees
are in such a situation, then their collective agreement could turn down individual behavior, and
they could collude to avoid deviations.
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The interaction between employers and employees can help to define
some gray areas like productivity requirements and the firm's objectives.
In general, the workers have better information regarding the capabilities
and their use of the Internet, and the firm also knows and understands its
objectives and requirements better. Both parties can then find an optimal
arrangement in order to define the optimal level of employee effort needed
to reach a desired productivity level in exchange for time to use the
Internet for personal activities. This type of incentive-compatible contract
based on full disclosure, employee participation in defining e-policy, and
employer monitoring can promote mutual trust 9 and embody the firm's
commitment to fair dealing.294 This approach can, in turn, produce more
economically efficient results compared to other agreements based largely
on self-interested behavior by the principal. This solution is also consistent
with other recent work by Cooter and Eisenberg showing that agents can
internalize fairness norms that are firm-specific and engage in more
295
cooperative behavior thereby creating value and contributing to profits.
Relying on the employer and employee to contractually seek a solution
is made even more appealing when the subject matter is electronic privacy.
In cyberspace "bottom-up" regulation, like the approach advocated here,
can be superior to "top-down" regulation, like federal statutes.296 In the
dynamic environment of computing, statutes may be more uniform and
inflexible than the situation requires. 297 New problems in cyberspace are
particularly suited to the lowest level of control. Therefore, a contractual
solution can provide a better solution, especially in the absence of
externalities.29 With respect to e-mail privacy in the workplace, since

293. Winters, supra note 27, at 105-06 (noting that "[i]mplicit within the employer-employee
relationship is some element of trust. Trust engenders teamwork, and teamwork sets the stage for
increased productivity").
294. Flanagan, supra note 85, at 1280-81 ("Implementing an articulate workplace electronic
privacy policy . . . would greatly reduce the adversarial relationship between employers and
employees that is often a product of secretive monitoring, thereby fostering a more cooperative
relationship. Such cooperative relationships would produce a'win-win' situation. Employees would
benefit from an improved working environment, and employers would profit from increased
productivity. Realizing the opportunity to create this mutually advantageous situation, some
companies already have entered into discussions with employees to create an internal electronic
privacy policy closely resembling the Act.").
295. See Robert Cooter& Melvin A. Eisenberg, Fairness,CharacterandEfficiency in Firms.
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1717, 1717 (2001) (urging that firm-specific, fairness-specific norms can be
internalized by agents and promote efficiency).
296. Trotter Hardy, The ProperLegal Regime for "Cyberspace, " 55 U. PITr. L. REV. 993,
1025 (1994); Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, NeitherBottom-Up Nor Top-Down: A Tacit PublicPrivate Cooperative Solutionfor InternetRegulation (forthcoming in 2002), available on Social
Science Research Network, at http://www.ssm.com.
297. Hardy, supra note 296, at 1025.
298. Id.
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employer and employee are already in a working relationship, the
transaction costs for implementing the approach described above will be
low. 299 Furthermore, companies vary widely as to how much e-mail
security they require, and employees can also vary as to how much
electronic privacy they demand."' Taking into account how "hard [it is] to
know what 'e-mail in the workplace' will look like in only a few years'
time" indicates how unsuitable a uniform, universal, statutory solution
might be.3 ' Even commentators who are skeptical about law and
economics insights with respect to electronic privacy still conclude that a
market solution is superior to government regulation in this arena for two
reasons: (1) "ease" of evasion would make enforcement difficult, and (2)
the variation across all companies eliminates the possibility of a fair, yet
uncomplicated, law.302
It is possible that we might see a legislative response to the concerns of
employees and employers regarding e-mail and Internet use and workplace
monitoring. Such a legislative solution can incorporate the contractarian
proposal outlined above by codifying the principles of employee
participation in creating e-policy, complete disclosure of implementation
measures, and support for employer monitoring. In the past Congress has
attempted to pass statutes requiring notice of electronic monitoring." 3
These attempts, however, have included a near-universal ban on
continuous monitoring, and hence, they were not successful due to
opposition from the business world.3" 4 The proposal outlined in this Article
attempts to find a solution that is compatible with the incentives of
employees and employers and is therefore more likely to be embraced by
both camps during the legislative give-and-take.
Finally, in order to devise a practical system for independent employee
participation in developing e-policies, in some workplaces, it will be
necessary to ensure that there is no employer domination or control, 305 in
accordance with Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).0 6 This may require the formation of a "privacy committee" or

299. Id. at 1032.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 1033; Kesan & Gallo, supra note 296.
302. Davidson, supra note 186, at 166.
303. See supra note 80 and accompanying text discussing the PWCA.
304. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
305. I am grateful to my colleague, Matt Finkin, for bringing this issue to my attention and for
educating me about Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA. See Matthew W. Finkin, Bridging the
"Representation Gap," 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391, 413 (2001) (urging formation of
independent, employee-elected committees to bridge the representation gap and outlining how these
committees might be established without running afoul of section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA).
306. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2001) (correspondingto section 8(a)(2) oftheNLRAthat outlines
unfair labor practices).
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"information technology committee" with elected representatives who are
*given the responsibility of dealing with management in formulating rules
and policies. A detailed discussion of the compatibility vel non between
Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA and implementation of this proposal is
beyond the scope of this Article.
In the next section, I will discuss the specific content of e-policies
implemented within the framework outlined above.
B. Defining Workplace E-Policies
Workplace e-policies must articulate clear standards to minimize
employment disputes and must enable consistent administration of
employer-employee relations. 0 7 Recognizing that a carefully crafted
computer and Internet use policy must incorporate significant details
regarding permissible, excessive, and forbidden use, in this section, I will
highlight the key areas that ought to be considered. The specific policy
features selected depend on the specifics of an individual workplace, but
most policies must contain some common elements. 0 8
The typical areas that ought to be addressed are:3 9
(A)

Establishing ownership and user guidelines for
computer and Internet use: for example, considering
outlining appropriate business use and personal use of
computers and the Internet, specifying forbidden
content and forbidden use, and specifying the
employer's right to access e-mail on the employer's
computer system.

(B)

Defining monitoring policies and procedures and
informing employees about the details of such
monitoring (see next section).310

307. Baum, supra note 20, at 1035.
308. Brown, supra note 77, at 670.
309. Some examples of policies may be found in the following sources: Brown, supra note
77, at 670-73; RICHARD RAYSMAN ET AL., MULTIMEDIA LAW: FORMS AND ANALYSIS § 10.08
(2000) (giving policies specifically directed to e-mail, offensive communications, trade secrets, and
unsolicited ideas, online copyright infringement); Setting up a CorporatePolicyfor Internet Use:
A Checklist, COMPUTER L. STRATEGIST, Oct. 1995, at 4; Klein, supra note 182, at 749-54; Erik J.
Blanoff et al., E-mail: PropertyRights vs. PrivacyRights in the Workplace (with Model Consent
Forms and CommunicationsPolicy), 45 No. 8 PRAC. LAW. 29, 50-53 (Dec. 1999); and Arthur D.
Rutkowski & Barbara Lang Rutkowski, Update on E-mail (Computer, E-Mail, Voice Mail and
Internet Access), 15 No. 9 EMP. L. UPDATE 3 (Sept. 2000).
310. Michaels & Steinberg, supra note 223, at 10.11.1(a).
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(C)
*
"
•
"
(D)
"
"
*
*
•
"
"

Educating employees about the risks of using e-mail
and the Internet." For example, consider informing
employees:
that e-mail is irretrievable.
that Internet activities can be traced by third parties.
about download procedures and the risk of viruses.
about prohibitions on inappropriate and illegal uses.
Limiting employer liability: for example, include
information designed to curtail employee conduct for
which the firm may be liable.
Harassment, discrimination and defamation claims.312
Copyright and patent infringement issues," 3 specifying
limits on what might be downloaded from the Internet
or exchanged through e-mail.
Revealing confidential information.
Informing employees of circumstances that may lead
to liability. 14
Using technological means to prevent trade secret and
confidential files from being transmitted.
Mandating the use of encryption software or banning
the transmission of sensitive information.
Creating an approval policy for information to be
published on the Web.
C. Monitoring

The very existence of a monitoring program reduces employee
abuses."' Since monitoring can have a negative impact on employee
morale,316 monitoring should be narrowly tailored to satisfy businessrelated, administrative, or legal needs, and any review of personal e-mail
ought to be limited to ensure protection of personal information.317 One
option that has been proposed is using a third party to perform the
monitoring so as not to have the employer uncover personal, but
potentially 'appropriate, visits to web sites providing information about
cancer, substance abuse, and the like. 1 In addition, there are technology
measures that fall short of monitoring e-mail but are nevertheless quite
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Morse & Magyera, supra note 221, at 53-54.
Rosove, supranote 177.
McKenzie, supranote 178, at 90.
Id.
See Morris, supra note 196, at 1099.
Baum, supra note 20, at 1041 n.153.
Adams et al., supra note 101, at 45.
Morris, supra note 196, at 1099.
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effective, even if somewhat less so in terms of detecting e-mail-related
non-compliance. For example, "blocklists" can be set up to deny access to
offensive URLs.31 9 Other programs that still fall short of monitoring e-mail
may be used to monitor Internet statistics such as visits and time spent at
Web sites.32° One such product is eSniff, which "monitors all network
traffic and flags activity that could cause problems. It defines categories,
then analyzes the content and context of all computer network activity to
falls into a category that an employer has
determine if any communication
32
established as inappropriate. 1
VI. CONCLUSION
It is well established that neither statutory law nor the common law in
the U.S. guarantees an employee's right to privacy in the workplace.
Drawing upon principal-agent theory, I show that we can address the
underlying concerns of employers and employees functioning in a wired
workplace in a contractarian framework. I contend that a modem,
computerized workplace reduces the powers enjoyed by the principal and
reduces her ability to act against the agent unilaterally and effectively.
Hence, we can design an incentive-compatible, benefit-maximizing
contract between employers and employees based on the following
principles: employee participation indefining e-policies; full disclosure of
all implementation schemes pursuant to these e-policies; and employer
monitoring to ensure compliance with such e-policies. In addition, such an
optimal contract promotes mutual trust and fair dealing and cultivates the
formation of fairness norms, which in turn, increases productivity and
contributes to higher profits. Finally, should Congress decide to act, the
principles outlined above can serve as the basis for new legislation in this
arena.

319. Id.at 1098.
320. Rosove, supra note 177.
321. Policy, supra note 222, at I I(describing the eSniff software).
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